Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons by Shackel, Nicholas
 1
Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.  
 
10 March 2013. To appear in Philosophical Studies. The final publication is available at 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-013-0117-7 
 
Abstract: In his important recent book Schroeder proposes a Humean theory of reasons 
that he calls hypotheticalism. His rigourous account of the weight of reasons is crucial to 
his theory, both as an element of the theory and constituting his defence to powerful 
standard objections to Humean theories of reasons. In this paper I examine that rigourous 
account and show it to face problems of vacuity and consonance. There are technical 
resources that may be brought to bear on the problem of vacuity but implementation is not 
simple and philosophical motivation a further difficulty.  Even supposing vacuity is fixed, 
the problems of consonance bring to light a different obstruction lying in Schroeder’s 
path. There is a difference between the general weighing of reasons and the context 
specificity of the correct placing of weight on them in deliberation and this difference 
cannot be fixed by the resources in the account. For these reasons we are still waiting for a 
plausible Humean theory of reasons. 
 
Introduction 
In his important recent book Schroeder proposes a Humean theory of reasons that he 
calls hypotheticalism: 
Reason: For R to be a reason for X to do A is for there to be some p such 
that X has a desire whose object is p, and the truth of R is part of what 
explains why X’s doing A promotes p. (Schroeder 2007a:59) 
The general argument of the book has a number of prongs:  
1. that opponents of Humean theories of reasons burden Humean theories with 
commitments and doctrines that those theories need not accept, and that  
hypotheticalism explicitly rejects (chapters 2 and 3);1  
2.  that hypotheticalism does not fall prey to the standard objections that are raised 
against Humean theories (chapters 5, 6 and 10); 
3. that hypotheticalism can give an account of normative reasons that fits the 
constraints and roles widely expected or desired of such an account (chapters 4 
and 7); 
4. that hypotheticalism has additional powerful explanatory benefits (chapter 9).  
If successful, then, hypotheticalism is a strong theory. Part of the theory is the account 
of the weight of reasons that Schroeder offers in chapter 7.  It plays a significant role in 
each of the above prongs.  
First of all, Schroeder needs his account of the weight of reasons in order to avoid what 
he calls the doctrine of proportionalism. It seems natural for a Humean theory of reasons 
to account for the weight of reasons by the strength of the correlate desires. This has the 
consequence that people with strong but foolish desires have strong reasons for foolish 
ends, conflicting with our intuition that they do not. Schroeder thinks that for this kind of 
reason proportionalism is ‘not even extensionally correct’  and that furthermore it offers 
                                                 
1 I’m indicating in brackets where these prongs are particularly prominent but they also feature in 
other chapters. 
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the wrong kind of analysis of the weight of reasons because ‘the weight of reasons is a 
normative matter’ (Schroeder 2007a:100). Opponents of Humean theories will agree, but 
demand of Schroeder what he has to put in its place. 
Secondly, Schroeder’s account of the weight of reasons plays an important role in 
answering two standard objections raised against Humean theories of reasons. Humean 
theories are held to be committed both to too many reasons, because people have desires 
for things they in fact lack reasons for, and to too few reasons, because people do not 
desire things that they in fact have reasons for. Schroeder’s answer to the first is that we 
do have all these reasons, but the ones appealed to by opponents are ones that, whilst 
present, have very little weight (and which for reasons of conversational implicature we 
do not cite, since Grice’s informativeness requirement implies mentioning only weighty 
reasons). Hence 
Hypotheticalism....does owe us at least enough of an account of the weight 
of reasons in order to make good on the crucial claim necessary for my 
response to the too many reasons objection to work. (Schroeder 2007a:101) 
Schroeder argues that the too few reasons objection also depends on proportionalism and 
accepts that he needs to account for ‘the agent-neutral reasons of morality [that] are 
equally good reasons for everyone’(Schroeder 2007a:122).  
Thirdly, the account of the weight of reasons is needed if hypotheticalism is to do more 
than explain merely the existence of reasons. Schroeder wishes to accept ‘reason 
basicness: what it is to be normative is to be analysed in terms of reasons’ (Schroeder 
2007a:193) and such analyses require reasons to have weights. For example, the account 
of what someone ought to do is often given in terms of doing whatever has most reason: 
the reasons for it outweigh those against. Schroeder also thinks that proportionalism fails 
here, because it fails to explain  
‘why it is a truism that if one reason is weightier than another , it is correct 
to place more weight on it in deliberation.’ (Schroeder 2007a:122) 
He intends to explain this correct placement of weight in deliberation in terms of a more 
general principle about what is correct to do and applying it to the placing of weight in 
deliberation. What is correct to do in general is determined by the most weighty of the 
right kind of reasons, where the right kinds of reasons are relative to the activity (see 
Schroeder 2007a:134-5). 
Finally, Schroeder sketches a number of explanatory benefits of hypotheticalism that 
depend on his account of weight. Based on that account he explains: the Aristotelean 
doctrine that ‘When you desire the right things to the right degree your motivation to act 
will correspond to the weight of your reasons’ (Schroeder 2007a:196); that reasons and 
their weight are metaphysically unmysterious because they are reducible as the theory sets 
out; that because of this last and because of the account of what it is to act for a reason, 
we have moral knowledge, we have wide disagreement and the virtuous (those whose 
desire to the degree corresponding to the weight of reasons) are more reliable in moral 
knowledge. For these reasons I think it is clear that Schroeder’s account of the weight of 
reasons is a central part of hypotheticalism, so central that hypotheticalism pretty much 
stands or falls with that account. Unfortunately, I don’t think that the account works. 
Schroeder disciplines himself to present his account of the weight of reasons with 
defined principles and a formal model that is intended to satisfy those principles. I shall 
call this Schroeder’s rigourous account of the weight of reasons. To have undertaken this 
discipline is a virtue since it means the account is definite enough to forestall the endless 
interpretations and reinterpretations that broader and more loosely expressed accounts 
 3
allow and in which philosophy can easily founder. Nevertheless, there is a difficulty in 
analysing such rigourous accounts. 2  
A broader thought may lie behind the account, indeed, is often mentioned in the set up, 
and that thought can usually be given a range of rigourous expositions. Since we must 
address the specific principles and the specific formal model offered by an author there is 
always the possibility that faults we find might be avoided by a different formal model 
and differently defined basic principles. The problem then is how much attention to give 
to the broader thought and the other possibilities. The broader thought is almost certain to 
have something going for it since otherwise it would not motivate our interest in the 
rigourous account. On the other hand, the claim on our attention is based at least in part in 
not leaving things broad but making it all definite enough to face the risk of refutation. 
In Schroeder’s case there has been some discussion of some of the broader thoughts, 
not just on the weights of reasons but from the whole book, in a symposium in 
Philosophical Studies  (Dancy 2012; McPherson 2012; Schroeder 2012a, b; Shafer-
Landau 2012). That discussion did not engage at any depth with the rigourous account; 
consequently, however strong the objections raised in that discussion may have been, 
there are a number of very good reasons why any such objections cannot be allowed 
simply to impugn his rigourous account. The objections may not actually bear on the 
account since we do not offer such accounts as mere interpretations of our looser concepts 
and  thoughts but also as better replacements for them (consider for example the relation 
between the common and the topological concepts of continuity). Rigourous accounts 
have virtues and powers that require analysis on their own terms and these may outweigh 
defects in some of the underlying thoughts. On the other hand, a formal model may give 
unwarranted rhetorical support, the mere appearance of rigour, if left unexamined.  
So there are good reasons to examine closely Schroeder’s rigourous account. I shall 
explain the account and show the problems I detect therein. I shall be focusing entirely on 
the account in chapter 7 of the book because even though there is an earlier paper on the 
same topic (Schroeder 2007b), the paper is mostly about locating proportionalism as the 
basis for the too many and too few reasons objections and offers what he explicitly states 
is ‘only the sketch of a theory’ (Schroeder 2007b:127) that is spelt ‘out more completely 
in Slaves of the Passions’ (Schroeder 2007b:131 fn 20). That examination takes a lot of 
space and the space to return to the broader thoughts and to other possibilities for their 
implementation will be limited.  
Structure of Schroeder’s  solution 
Schroeder takes off from his main reason for rejecting proportionalism: that ‘the weight 
of reasons is a normative matter’ (Schroeder 2007a:100). Ally this with what he calls 
reason basicness (see above) and the weight of reasons must itself be explained in terms 
of reasons. These thoughts are to be captured in some defined principles, Attractive Idea, 
Ought, Correct and Right Kind of Reasons (see below). Attractive Idea  and Correct 
(when applied to Attractive Idea) together constitute a definition of the weightier-than 
relation and their explanatory success as outlined in section 7.2 is ‘evidence that we are on 
the right track’ (Schroeder 2007a:136). A problem with that definition is that it is circular. 
The general intention is that the definition of the weightier-than relation in section 7.3  is 
independent of the principles and so solves the circularity problem, whilst at the same 
time it is supposed to ‘be able to preserve the nice picture set up in section 7.2’ (Schroeder 
2007a:138).  
                                                 
2 See also Russell 1918:179 ff. for discussion on these points. 
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The definition itself is recursive. Having mentioned his reservation about recursive 
analyses being disjunctive Schroeder then explains that he is less worried than he might 
be just because his definition yields Attractive Idea as ‘something interesting and unified 
that we can say about the weight of reasons’ (Schroeder 2007a:139). On the other hand, 
the defined principles were also introduced as motivations for 
the shape of the analysis of the weightier-than relation that I advocate, and 
…spell … out in section 7.3 (Schroeder 2007a:129) 
 
So the dialectic of chapter 7, and in particular that of section 7.2 and its relation to 
defining the weightier-than relation in section 7.3, is complex. As I understand it, the 
resultant broad structure of the solution to the weight of reasons has at its base the 
recursive definition of the weightier-than relation which definition entails3 Attractive Idea. 
Attractive Idea, however, is not a mere entailment but it in turn ‘explains for us why the 
disjunctive account provided by Weight Base and Weight Recursion is nevertheless in a 
certain way unified’(Schroeder 2007a:141, his emphasis). Finally, Attractive Idea explains 
both Ought and Correct and the circularity is not a problem because the weightier-than 
relation was defined at the base rather than at this level.  
The nature of this kind of account is that the weightier-than relation is primary and a 
reason having weight is derived from the weightier-than relation.4 For a reason to have 
weight is for it to stand in the weightier-than relation to other reasons. Alternatively, being 
perhaps the most general definition of what it is for a reason to have weight derivatively 
from a weightier-than relation, for a reason to have weight is for it to make some 
difference to the weightier-than relation standing between some other reasons when it is 
added to them somehow.5  
Formal framework 
Schroeder notes some constraints. First he points out that the metaphor of weight can’t 
be cashed out literally as quantities: quantities are generally comparable whereas reasons 
need not be; quantities can always be added whereas some reasons are not independent 
and so can’t be added;6 and if taken as quantities adding over generalises because, for 
example, my pound of flour and your pound of flour can be added to make two pounds 
but my reason to dance cannot be added to your reason to dance. 
So he sets up a formal framework to represent reasons and their weights along the 
following lines:  
Strictly speaking, I will say, it is not reasons that have weights, but only sets 
of reasons. Not any old set of reasons has a weight, however. Only sets of 
reasons for the same agent to do the same thing count. And finally, I will 
define the weight of a set of reasons not by establishing a correspondence 
                                                 
3 Schroeder uses the words ‘yields’ and ‘predicts’ and we will discuss this later. 
4 Although Schroeder doesn’t state this explicitly he confirms in a communication as a referee of 
this paper that this is the natural thing to say. 
5 In terms of the formal model we are about to look at we would get this: A reason, <r, x, a>, has 
weight just in case there exist Q, V ∈ SS such that  <r, x, a>∉ Q ∪V  and [(Q ≻ V  and 
(Q⊕<r,x,a>⊁ V or Q⊁ V⊕<r,x,a> or Q⊕<r,x,a>⊁ V⊕<r,x,a>)) or (Q ⊁ V  and (Q⊕<r,x,a>≻ V 
or Q≻ V⊕<r,x,a> or Q⊕<r,x,a>≻ V⊕<r,x,a>))]. 
6 e.g. Schroeder accepts that if R is a reason to Φ then  the existential fact of there being that 
reason to Φ is itself a reason to Φ but obviously adding the two together doesn’t increase the 
weight of reasons to Φ.  
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between sets of reasons and some further thing—amounts of weight—but by 
defining a partial ordering on sets of reasons: the weightier than ordering 
(Schroeder 2007a:126-7) 
So formally, we can represent reasons by ordered triples <R,X,A>, where R 
is a reason, X is an agent, and A is an action-type. Let us say that <R,X,A> is 
proper if R is a reason for X to do A, and let S be the set of all such proper 
triples. So S represents the set of all reasons. Now we can define a new set, 
SS , of ‘addable’ subsets of S. The members of SS are subsets of S that are 
invariant with respect to x and a [sic]7. Intuitively, they are sets of reasons 
that it makes sense to add up. And then we define a relation on S S ×S S , ≻, 
which represents the weightier-than relation. ≻ is irreflexive, antisymmetric, 
and transitive, and holds between two sets when the reasons in the first set 
add up to more than the reasons in the second set. (Schroeder 2007a:127) 
The internal structure of this kind of formal model that we shall need to attend to is not 
as clear as it might be from the brief specification and is not drawn out by Schroeder 
elsewhere. I am therefore going to articulate it before we move on, with a small change of 
notation which for obvious reasons is more perspicuous. 
Let R be the set of all reason type things, X the set of persons and A the set of action 
types, and let x, r and a be any member of those domains respectively. When we need to 
speak of several possibly distinct members of a domain we will index the variables or use 
letters nearby in the alphabet. Then 
S, Schroeder’s set of reasons, ={<r, x, a>: <r, x, a> is proper} 
What Schroeder means by  ‘addable subset’ is not (as it sounds) that addable subsets can 
in general be added together. Both {<r, Fred, a>} and {<r, Joe, a>} are in S but he 
intends to exclude the addition of different people’s reasons. Rather, an addable subset is a 
set of reasons each of which can be added together— and what you get having added 
together all of the reasons in the set is that very set. So reason addition is really defined by 
<ri, x, a>⊕<rj, x, a>={<ri, x, a>,<rj, x, a>} 
<ri, x, a>⊕{<rj, x, a>,…..,<rn, x, a>}={<ri, x, a>,<rj, x, a>,…..,<rn, x, a>} 
The item on the RHS is the kind of thing Schroeder is calling a subset of addable reasons 
but it would have been better if he had called them subsets of added reasons and that is 
what we shall do. 
Let Tx,a ={<r, x, a>: <r, x, a>∈S}.  
Tx,a is the set of all the reasons for x to do a. Note that the indexed sets,{ Tx,a: x∈X ,a∈A}, 
partition S. Each of these indexed sets is a maximal set of added reasons since any reasons 
that are eligible for adding together are members of a single one of these sets and any 
larger set containing one of these indexed sets will have a member that cannot be added to 
them. Consequently the power set of  Tx,a gives us the set of all the subsets of added 
reasons for x to do a. 
Let  Px,a = the power set of Tx,a.  
Then  
Let  Px  = ∪a∈A Px,a 
                                                 
7 These lower case letters are presumably a typo since Schroeder is using upper case for variables, 
but it is in line with the notation we’ll be using in place of his. 
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Let  Pa  = ∪ x∈X Px,a 
Px is the set of all the subsets of added reasons for x. Pa  is the set of all the subsets of 
added reasons for doing a. Px is usefully remembered as the set of all x’s reasons and all 
combinations of those reasons and likewise Pa is the set of all the reasons to do a and all 
combinations of those reasons. In a standard abuse of notation, in future appearances of 
these we will speak of <r, x, a> as being a member of Px or Pa when strictly speaking it is 
the unit set, {<r, x, a>}, that is the member. 
 Finally Schroeder’s SS is 
SS = ∪ x∈X ,a∈A Px,a = ∪ x∈X Px = ∪a∈A Px 
So SS is the set of all the subsets of added reasons. Note that SS\∅ is partitioned by each of 
{Px,a\∅:  x∈X ,a∈A}, {Px\∅:  x∈X } and {Pa\∅: a∈A}.8 We’ll call {Px\∅: x∈X } the 
partitioning by persons and {Pa\∅: a∈A} the partitioning by acts. The weightier-than 
relation, ≻, is the subset of SS × SS: 
≻={< Q, V >: Q, V ∈ SS +constraint on Q and  V} 
where constraint amounts to the substantive definition of the weightier-than relation, a 
definition which must result in ≻ satisfying the partial order axioms (and any other 
formal constraints that we think apply). I put it like this rather than including the partial 
order axioms in constraint (which is how Schroeder puts it) because being a partial order 
is a truth about reasons that a formal model must satisfy and including the axioms in  
constraint misrepresents this fact as something internal to the model or part of the 
substantive definition. 
Strictly speaking, the status of this formal model is for S to be the extension of the 
reason relation, defined as a  relation that holds between reasons, persons and actions and 
for ≻ to be the extension of the weightier-than relation on reasons. Schroeder doesn’t 
worry about regimenting definitions across relations and their extensions. This results in a 
certain amount of abuse of notation, perhaps particularly speaking of both r and <r, x, a> 
as reasons. In some places we will need to disambiguate but otherwise we won’t worry 
either.  
Clearly this framework can be used to furnish models of many different theories of 
reasons by their definition of constraint. When the formal model is fully defined to give 
us a model of Schroeder’s account of the weight of reasons, constraint will be his 
substantive definition of the weightier-than relation, ≻,  on reasons. So this definition 
distinguishes his formal model from others that could be formulated in the same formal 
framework. From here on when speaking of ≻ we speak of Schroeder’s relation 
exclusively.  
Schroeder’s definition must not be inconsistent, neither internally nor with the partial 
order axioms. It must make it determinate for each Q, V ∈ SS  whether the pair < Q, V > is 
in ≻ and it must not through some defect result in the vacuity of ≻ (e.g. it is no good if 
≻=∅). Then  ≻ must be consonant with its roles in the defined principles and  ≻ in 
combination with those principles must also be consonant with features appealed to in 
those principles: with facts about reasons, their weight and the correctness of placing 
                                                 
8 It might be thought that ∅ shouldn’t be a member of SS but Schroeder’s definition of SS entails it 
and his recursive definition of the weightier-than relation requires it to be so. I believe any 
problems can be technically ironed but as is evident here, it’s presence complicates the partitions. 
 7
weight on reasons in deliberation. We shall now look in detail at the recursive definition 
and then I shall show that Schroeder has problems with both vacuity and consonance.   
The recursive definition 
Let us now see the problem that the recursive definition is to solve.  The Attractive Idea 
given in section 7.2 is: 
Attractive Idea For R  to be a weightier set of reasons to do A than S (R≻S) 
is for it to be correct to place more weight on R than on S in deliberation 
about whether to do A. (Schroeder 2007a:130)9 
Schroeder doesn’t say it but we must take R and S to be in SS and for the reasons given in 
the footnote I will be using ‘D’ and ‘E’ to refer to such sets of reasons. Then we have 
Correct For it to be correct to do A is for it to be the case that SA ≻S~A . 
(Schroeder 2007a:134)10 
where each of these sets of reasons, SA and S~A, has been defined as sets of reasons of the 
right kind, which in this case Schroeder intends to be reasons shared by everyone engaged 
in deliberation (based on his definition of Right Kind of Reasons, see below). 
The circularity of defining the weightier than relation,  ≻, by Schroeder’s principles 
Attractive Idea + Correct  is fairly evident since Attractive Idea defines ≻in terms of 
correctness of placing weight in deliberation and Correct defines the latter in terms of ≻ 
standing between sets of reasons (of the right kind for placing weight in deliberation).  
Schroeder offers to reveal the circularity thus:  
start by taking the Attractive Idea, and substituting in the analysis provided 
by Correct, in order to make the circularity explicit: 
Better For set of reasons A to be weightier than set of reasons B is for the 
set of all the (right kind of) reasons to place more weight on A to be 
weightier than the set of all the (right kind of) reasons to place more weight 
on B. (Schroeder 2007a:138) 
I am now going to extend our formal notation, for reasons that will become evident 
shortly when we investigate the regress in Schroeder’s recursive definition. We will be 
meeting complexly nested propositions whose expression without these symbols would be 
immensely cumbersome. 
Let  D, E be in SS. Let d>e be the act of placing more weight on D than on E.11 Let 
Wd>e the set of all reasons of the right kind to do d>e. Let d<e be the act of placing more 
weight on E than on D. Let Wd<e be the set of all the reasons of the right kind to do d<e.  
Then Better amounts to 
Better For D≻E is for Wd>e ≻ Wd<e 
  
                                                 
9 As you can see Schroeder uses ‘R’ for a set of reasons when he has already used that to stand for 
a reason, and uses ‘S’ for a set of reasons that is a subset of S as earlier defined. Later he uses ‘A’ 
for a set of reasons when earlier it stood for an action. For perspicuity throughout the discussion I 
shall generally correct these and other notational flaws, including his use of capital letters as 
variables, with the terminology already introduced.  
10 SA  is a set of reasons for doing act A and S~A is a set of reasons for not doing act A. 
11 I am using ‘d>e’ as the name of an act type. 
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It is evident that this is circular and entails a vicious infinite regress, since  D≻E 
requires a metaphysically prior Wd>e ≻ Wd<e which in turn requires a prior pair, and so 
on. Schroeder’s proposed solution is to  
improve on Better by making it recursive:  
Weight Base One way for set of reasons A to be weightier than set of 
reasons B is for set B to be empty, but A non-empty. 
Weight Recursion The other way for set of reasons A to be weightier than 
set of reasons B is for the set of all the (right kind of) reasons to place more 
weight on A to be weightier than the set of all the (right kind of) reasons to 
place more weight on B. 
Weight Recursion is basically just Better. Weight Base gives us an 
independent way for one set of reasons to count as weightier than another, 
getting us out of the imminent conceptual and explanatory regress. 
(Schroeder 2007a:138) 
Formally 
 For D≻E  is either for 
Base axiom for ≻ : D to be non-empty and E empty, or for 
Recursion axiom for ≻ : Wd>e ≻ Wd<e. 
 
The idea that Schroeder has about his recursive definition is that it is supposed to allow 
the regress that results from following Better to ground out at some point with a non-
empty set outweighing an empty set.  
Weight Base simply tries to characterize what it takes for things to stop, in 
this way—or rather, for an explanation of the weight of some reason 
ultimately to get started. Weight Recursion tells us how, once it is started, it 
continues to proceed. (Schroeder 2007a:138-9) 
So in general D≻E waits on Wd>e ≻ Wd<e , which in turn waits on 
W(Wd>e> Wd<e) ≻ W(Wd>e< Wd<e), 12 which in its turn waits on 
W(W(Wd>e>Wd<e)>W(Wd>e<Wd<e) ) ≻ W(W(Wd>e>Wd<e)<W(Wd>e<Wd<e) ) 
and so on.  
Schroeder’s idea is that eventually one of the sets on the RHS will be empty whilst the 
corresponding one on the LHS will be non-empty. So if, for example, W(Wd>e> Wd<e) is 
non-empty and W(Wd>e< Wd<e) is empty then by the base axiom W(Wd>e> Wd<e) ≻ 
W(Wd>e< Wd<e) hence Wd>e ≻ Wd<e follows by the recursion axiom, whence D≻E follows 
by the recursion axiom. 
                                                 
12 I have extended our notation in a way that is, I hope, intuitive. Wd>e>Wd<e is the act of placing 
more weight on Wd>e than on  Wd<e and W(Wd>e> Wd<e) is the set of all the right kind of reasons to 
do so. 
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Non-standard recursion 
Note first of all that the axioms alone provide no guarantee that we ever meet empty 
sets and hence no guarantee that the regress grounds out in the base axiom. Contrast this 
with the way recursive definitions standardly work. For example, consider the definition 
of  addition on the natural numbers from the successor function, s, that maps each number 
to the next one.  
Base axiom: n+1 = s(n) 
Recursion axiom: n+s(m)=s(n+m) 
Since for all natural numbers, m, s(m) is finitely many steps from 1, finitely many 
applications of the recursion axiom (m−1, in fact) will get us to the base axiom. For 
example 
 n+4  = s(n+3) = s(s(n+2) =s(s(s(n+1)) by recursion 
and now we can apply the base axiom to get 
  =s(s(s(s(n))), e.g. if n= 1 the answer is  s(s(s(s(1))) which is 5, since 
5 just is the successor of the successor of the successor of the successor of 1.  
This recursive definition of addition guarantees that the addition of any two numbers has a 
sum because of the nature of the recursion axiom. The recursion axiom, whilst circular, 
institutes a single step backwards towards the base axiom when there are only finitely 
many such steps needed to get there. Then the base axiom defines addition at the base in 
terms of the successor function, thereby removing the circularity.  
So standard recursive definitions have a recursion axiom showing how to work back 
towards the base axiom. Schroeder’s recursion axiom does not do that. Schroeder 
confirms in communication this difference. He is nevertheless confident that his definition 
captures ‘the most important basic structural fact for any account of the weight of reasons 
to capture’ (Schroeder 2012c), a structural fact that he believes is also manifest in the well 
known non-monotonic cases from epistemology of defeaters and defeaters of defeaters. 
So there is an interesting broader thought lying behind the recursive definition, that 
weight involves regression. That thought may be right but, as already mentioned, a 
commendable virtue of the book’s theory of the weight of reasons is precisely not to have 
left matters at that level but to commit itself to testable definitions. The problems that I 
am about to elucidate are problems specific to the recursive definition Schroeder offers. If 
Schroeder is right in the broad thought then they are also problems that any structurally 
similar account of weight must avoid. 
Vacuity 
So Schroeder’s recursion axiom does not implement a step back towards the base 
axiom. As a result, for all we know from the recursive definition of weight we get nothing 
more than what is promised by the base axiom:  
≻ = {<Q,∅>: Q∈ SS\∅}. 
I take it that if ≻ is trivial in this way it would amount to the definition being vacuous. 
Only on the crucial additional assumption that there is a pair from SS\∅ for which 
following the regress created by the recursion axiom results in eventually bumping into a 
non-empty/empty pair is ≻ non-vacuous.  
Schroeder motivates the thought that we get to an empty set by reminding us of Lehrer 
and Paxson’s Tom Grabit case, in which we see Tom running from the library with a 
book. So we have evidence that he stole it, but then Mrs Grabit, his mother, says Tom was 
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away but his twin John was in the library, which is an undercutting defeater of knowing 
Tom stole, which in turn can be undercut by Mrs Grabit being ‘a compulsive and 
pathological liar’ (Lehrer and Paxson 1969:228), and so on. As we run down the sequence 
of defeaters whether we know or don’t know alternates with each one. When we inspect 
putative sequences of defeaters the nature of each member of the sequence is a readily 
graspable fact and on that basis it seems evident that they just do run out: it doesn’t take 
long to get to the end of all the relevant facts. So here it is intuitive that the defeaters run 
out at some point making it determinate whether we know. On some internalist views 
even if the sequence itself were an infinite regress it would not matter because the finitude 
of our minds guarantees that we possess only finitely many. The determinacy of whether 
we know is determined by the finitely many of the sequence of defeaters that we possess. 
Yet the analogy is not exact enough. 
Schroeder could not take the internalist way out of an infinite regress. Whether D≻E 
does not depend on how much of the regress above it we know, but on the nature of that 
regress itself. So it is essential for him that the regress be finite.  
As illustrated by the Grabit case, it is plausible that the sequence of defeaters 
concerning any putative item of knowledge is in fact finite, so suppose we take it that it is 
this finitude and its effect that is to be carried over by analogy. This now achieves far too 
much. For if we can be sure of meeting an empty set in the regress, and an empty set 
suffices for determinacy, this means that for all D, E in SS we can be sure that either D≻E  
or E≻D, which means that ≻ is a total order when it should be only a partial order. 
Although in the Grabit case the sequence of defeaters merely coming to an end after 
finitely many suffices for the determinacy of knowledge, the regress coming to an empty 
set does not suffice. It has to come to an empty set in the right way, namely we need an 
empty set and a non-empty set at the same level. So even if the analogy makes it plausible 
that we’ll meet an empty set eventually, it does nothing to make it plausible that we’ll 
meet it in the right way.  
At this point it might be thought, well, fine, so when we meet empty sets in the right 
way we’ve got weighing and when we don’t we haven’t so whether D≻E is determinate 
on that basis. This, however, is just a restatement of where the recursive definition leaves 
us. What we needed was to prove rather than merely assume that  ≻ is non-vacuous. All 
the Grabit case achieves by analogy so far is to underline the form of the solution that is 
needed and to prove too much or too little. 
Let us look directly at whether the material Schroeder supplies makes plausible that ≻ 
is non-vacuous. In the Grabit case inspection of the sequence of facts makes it plausible 
that they run out. Does a similar inspection of the contents of Schroeder’s regress make it 
plausible that it runs out at least sometimes in the right way, thereby making ≻ non-
vacuous? I believe not. The reason is that the contents of Schroeder’s regress are almost 
incomprehensible almost immediately.  
Just try to spell out even only the LHS of the antecedent we get after merely two 
applications of the recursion axiom, W(Wd>e> Wd<e) ≻ W(Wd>e< Wd<e).  
Two Steps Antecedent: W(Wd>e> Wd<e) is the set of all the reasons there are 
of the right kind to place more weight on the set of all the reasons there are 
of the right kind to place more weight on D than E than on the set of all the 
reasons there are of the right kind to place more weight on E than D.  
The problem here is not only that it is hard to make sense of but that it is this hard to make 
sense of at only the second step. Schroeder is essentially relying on an intuition motivated 
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by the Grabit case that somewhere up there we bump into a non-empty/empty pair. But 
the disanalogy here is extreme and significant: the members of the Grabit regress are 
readily graspable facts and these are incomprehensible obscurities. I think it is doubtful 
we have intuitions about what is going on that we can rely on. Trying to grasp the nature 
of the reasons in the set of Three Steps Antecedent: W(W(Wd>e> Wd<e) >W(Wd>e< Wd<e) ), 
it is quite unclear to me what such things would be even in a thorough going non-
naturalist Platonism for reasons, let alone when they have to be Humean reasons.  
We must remember that all these reasons must be explicable in terms of Schroeder’s 
definition of a reason (see again Reason above and on Schroeder 2007a:59). Again, very 
few steps up the regress and it is hard to see how we have things that can be explained in 
terms of promoting the object of a desire. They must also be partly explicable in terms of 
placing weight in deliberation (pace Attractive Idea) but something that cannot be 
mentally grasped cannot be weighed in deliberation and hence there can’t be such reasons 
making it correct to place weight in deliberation. 
Now it might be thought that this last point helps Schroeder, and perhaps it does, since 
it does at least weigh in on the side of meeting empty sets. The problem as it seems to me, 
however, is that if it does help him that much it seems likely that the emptiness arises 
consequent on the level of regress reached,13 and that is help of exactly the wrong kind. 
What we need is a pair of a non-empty and an empty set at the same level but this is 
promising a pair of empty sets at the same level.  
So inspection leads me to think we just don’t know what is going on here and without 
Schroeder making it a great deal clearer what is going on in the regress this is nothing 
more than the presentation of a purely formal possibility. When we bear in mind the 
obscurity of the kind of things we are talking about in the regress and bring to mind 
hypotheticalism’s reduction of reasons to explanations by desires, a purely formal 
possibility isn’t enough.  It has to be shown that the substance of hypotheticalism’s 
reasons can realize that possibility. Until that is done, the general obscurity leaves it 
entirely obscure whether this definition will result in ≻ being non-vacuous.  
Finally, whilst vacuity is a serious failure, non-vacuity alone achieves little. It does 
nothing to show that whatever does get into  ≻ are the right results for Schroeder, the 
right results being of two kinds. First, that many or most of the relative weights in the 
intuitive cases appealed to by opponents of Humean theories of reasons will be explained 
by this definition. Second, that many or most of the relative weights needed in prongs 2, 3 
and 4 of his general argument (see above) are furnished by this definition. Given the 
obscurity of the contents of the regress it, showing that it gives these right results looks 
extremely hard. 
Fixing vacuity 
The root idea is that Humean theories can get out of the problems of proportionalism if 
they can explain the weighing of reasons in terms of the correct placement of weight. The 
incipient circularity is unavoidable if we adhere to reason basicness: that normativity is 
explained by reasons. So the alternatives are to give up reason basicness or to get a 
recursive definition to work.  
The former requires an additional theory of correctness in weighing. I’m not sure how 
this could be done in a Humean way but it could certainly be done Platonistically. 
Reasons could be as Schroeder describes: partial explanations of acts promoting desired 
                                                 
13 likely because the complexity that blocks comprehension rises by level rather than across ≻at a 
single level. 
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ends whilst their weights are irreducible matters of objective fact. Reason is the faculty 
that attends to reasons and their weights. When we are rational we place weight in 
accordance with the objective weights. This would amount to a Humean non-naturalism, 
for many an unattractive hybrid since both Humeans and non-naturalists are likely to 
protest the need to include the other half of the hybrid. Schroeder, in particular, would 
probably think it amounts to abandoning his Humeanism just where he wants it most. 
So that leaves only getting a recursive definition to work. The prospects here are 
unclear. The natural first move is to look for a way of solving the main disanalogy with 
standard recursion, to find some way for at least some comparisons to step back towards 
the base axiom. We might start by removing all the reasons in common between the sets, 
where reasons in common are triples with the same reason type and act type. We would 
need to explain why reasons are sufficiently atomistic in effect that this can be done as a 
weight-order-neutral operation: the arguments for organic unities would all stand against 
this. Worse, this is not going to get us very far in the general case, and other rules for 
removing introduce other circularity problems. For example, remove subsets M and N 
from D and E respectively if M≻N. 
Another route would be to have a definition by induction on the number of reasons. The 
simplest example might be if, comparing same sized non-empty proper subsets, those of 
D weigh more than those of E then D weighs more than E. The point here is that we could 
start at the bottom with each unit set of each and the empty set and then build up 
somehow. The worry would be that we would get path dependent outcomes. A final route 
would be a combination of recursion and induction, and I think this is the most likely 
route to a solution, since one could hope to use each to avoid the problems of the other. 
For example, suppose D and E are sets whose weight we could not build up to inductively. 
The circularity of the proposal to removes subsets M and N from D and E respectively if 
M≻N could be avoided if we could build up inductively to M≻N  —and perhaps for D to 
outweigh E we would also have to fulfil special conditions, such as all inductive pairs 
from D and E, when weighable, to weigh in one direction rather than another. So there are 
technical resources to be explored in aid of a satisfactory definition of the weight of 
Schroeder’s reasons accompanied by significant philosophical challenges in motivating 
particular uses of those resources.  
Consonance 
We now turn to consonance: how well ≻ works in the defined principles and how as a 
whole they fit with features appealed to in those principles, with facts about reasons, their 
weight and the correctness of placing weight on reasons in deliberation. We will assume 
throughout that ≻ is not vacuous. I shall start by mentioning a couple of isolated issues 
before turning to a sequence of problems of consonance at the heart of the account: the 
claim that Attractive Idea constitutes the unity in the account, whether ≻ yields (as 
Schroeder puts it) Attractive Idea, whether Attractive Idea in turn yields Ought and 
Correct and whether its appearance of allowing the generality of the weight of reasons 
succeeds. 14 This will lead us to a significant obstacle to a central thrust of Schroeder’s 
theory, an obstacle that appears in a variety of ways in the sequence and is perhaps the 
ground of those problems. The obstacle is a difference between the generality of the 
                                                 
14 By the generality of the weight of reasons I mean that any reasons may be weightier than any 
others. My reasons may be weightier than yours, my reasons to do one thing may be weightier 
than my reasons to do another and so on. This appears in Schroeder’s theory as allowing that any 
sets of reasons that are members of SS may be weightier than any other.  
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weight of reasons  and the relevance of context to the correct placing of weight on them in 
deliberation. As we shall see, Attractive Idea tries to bridge this difference but does so 
unstably. The instability arises from the dropping of an act variable that occurs when 
Schroeder moves from Attractive Idea to a principle that Schroeder identifies with 
Attractive Idea called Still Attractive. 
Invariance of the weight of reasons 
An entailment of the recursive definition as given is that a member of SS outweighing 
another does not depend on context: if D≻E it is fixed that D≻E. So the account entails 
the invariance of the weight of reasons, but this invariance is controversial. For example, 
Dancy holds ‘Holism in the theory of reasons: a feature that is a reason in one case may 
be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another’ (see Dancy 2004:73). That is to say, 
what in one context is a reason for something in another may be a reason against it. This 
would mean the outweighing by this reason of another in the first context might be 
reversed in the second, contrary to invariance. So if Dancy is right then Schroeder’s 
account fails. There may be a way round this within Schroeder’s account if the kind of 
context that Dancy appeals to in showing the varying pollence of reasons can get packed 
into Schroeder’s sets of reasons. There is some awkwardness in doing this, less so for 
theoretical reasons than for practical reasons, since context generally doesn’t look like 
reasons.15  
 Bad reasons 
It seems that bad reasons are not all the same, some are worse than others, which is to 
say that even bad reasons have weight. If that is right then a problem with Weight Base is 
that it implies that any bad reason weighs more than no reason but that strikes me as the 
wrong way round.  
Bad reasons are, of course, controversial. Perhaps what we call bad reasons are not 
reasons at all, but are rather things we may mistakenly take for a reason (Kolodny could 
take this view, see Kolodny 2005). In that case their weight is also a mere appearance and 
need not be explained at all, or can be explained in counterfactual terms. This possibility 
is why this problem is less clearly well founded than others I raise. 
Other alternatives are that bad reasons are reasons but they are the wrong kinds of 
reasons or motivating reasons.16 In a paper discussing the right kind/wrong kind 
distinction (Schroeder 2010) deploys Correct to explain the distinction (and also fitting 
attitudes) where because the right kind are reasons shared relative to an activity the wrong 
kind are reasons that are not so shared. In Schroeder’s response to Dancy’s discussion 
(Dancy 2012; Schroeder 2012b) he agrees that motivating reasons are what is believed 
rather than the belief and seems thereby to accept Dancy’s non-factivity for reasons 
(Dancy 2000:section 6.3). So Schroeder seems to accept the reality of bad reasons.  
This may be fixable if we have a prior definition of good and bad reasons (which 
Schroeder may be able to construct by distinguishing good and bad explanations in his 
definition of hypotheticalism, see Reason above and on Schroeder 2007a:59) . We would 
need additional base axioms for the two classes of reasons with Weight Base as it stands 
for the good reasons and another base axiom reversing the direction of ≻for the bad 
reasons. There might be some problems for the recursion axiom, since now we have 
weighting chains both ‘above’ (for good reasons) and ‘below’ (for bad reasons) the empty 
                                                 
15 For example, cf.  Dancy’s distinction between reasons and enabling conditions. 
16 One might also take wrong kinds of reasons or motivating reasons as not reasons at all, as in the 
previous paragraph. 
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set, but it looks to me like it would still work as it stands. We would also need some 
motivated definitions of whether good and bad reasons are addable and this might 
introduce some additional complexity into the structure of SS. Whether the upshot of all 
this would serve Schroeder’s purposes would require detailed checking. 
The importance of Attractive Idea 
I mentioned earlier that Schroeder points out that his recursive analysis is ‘ultimately 
disjunctive’ and that he thinks ‘disjunctive accounts are rather problematic’, presumably 
for the familiar reasons that such accounts can be accused of being ad hoc. Schroeder says 
he is ‘less worried about the disjunctive nature of’ his account than he might be because  
the Weight Base/Weight Recursion account yields the result that there is 
something interesting and unified that we can say about the weight of 
reasons. And it is simply that: 
Still Attractive Set of reasons A is weightier than set of reasons B just in 
case it is correct to place more weight on A than on B.  
And that is just the Attractive Idea with which we began, stated now merely 
as an extensional thesis rather than an analysis. It therefore not only tells us 
something interesting about what weighty reasons all have in common, but 
allows us to preserve the predictions outlined in section 7.2’ (Schroeder 
2007a:139-40) 
So the Attractive Idea is no mere way station on the way to the account. It is an 
important part of the account in two ways: it is what constitutes the unity in the account 
despite the disjunctivity of the recursive definition and the account goes via the Attractive 
Idea in order to ‘preserve the predictions’ of the principles Ought and Correct.  
In outlining the structure of his solution above I took it that what Schroeder is either 
claiming or needs for this yielding of unity and preservation of prediction is that the 
recursive definition entails the Attractive Idea which in turn entails Ought and Correct. He 
might dispute this since he does at least motivate Attractive Idea and the principles of 
Ought and Correct that it predicts (as he puts it) independently. So he might say he is 
concerned merely with compatibility. To do so would weaken the support that his 
recursive definition would get from the truth of the principles and since in speaking of 
prediction he is using the rhetoric of the hypothetico-deductive method (the theory is 
supported by the truth of its predictions, which are its entailments given auxiliary 
hypotheses) it sounds as if he wants that support. So we are going to examine whether this 
intricate relation of ≻, Attractive Idea, Ought and Correct works. 
Does Attractive Idea solve the disjunctive problem? 
Let us start with the principle he says is yielded by the recursive definition: Still 
Attractive. It is not clear that Still Attractive is in fact the unified thing to be said about the 
weight of reasons because it is not clear that Still Attractive is true of members of the base 
pairs set, {<Q,∅>: Q∈ SS\∅}, which set we get from Weight Base. The problem here is 
that Still Attractive requires that for Q to be a weightier set of reasons than ∅ it requires it 
to be correct to place more weight on Q than on ∅. Now suppose Q are reasons to do a  
and we are deliberating whether to do b which is irrelevant to doing a. In this case it is not 
correct to place more weight on Q than on ∅.17 So although Still Attractive may apply to 
                                                 
17 There is a bullet that could be bitten here, namely to say that it is correct to place some weight 
on any reason to do anything when deliberating about any other thing but this is at least strongly 
counter-intuitive. 
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sets for which Weight Recursion applies, it doesn’t apply to all sets of reasons and so it 
can’t be ‘what weighty reasons all have in common’. 
In fact, the problem just raised gets worse. For suppose we are deliberating whether to 
do a. Now it is correct to place more weight on Q than on ∅.  Still Attractive gives us a 
contradiction from this and the previous incorrectness: that Q is weightier than ∅ and Q is 
not weightier than ∅. The root of this problem is that, intuitively, the correctness of 
placing weight on reasons in deliberation is relative to what one is deliberating about, but 
this fact (let us call it the Relativity of Placing Weight) is not reflected in Still Attractive.  
At this point it may appear I have been uncharitable or inaccurate, since Schroeder has 
clearly identified Still Attractive with Attractive Idea as essentially the same principle18 
and Attractive Idea has a variable for an act so it is clearly relativised to an act.  
The sets of reasons in Attractive Idea are not just any old sets of reasons in SS but reasons 
to do a and the correctness of placing more weight on one than the other is correctness 
when deliberating about whether to do a. So in proposing Attractive Idea Schroeder was 
indeed appealing to and capturing the intuition just mentioned. We must therefore read 
Still Attractive as elliptical in this respect, and since it is supposed to be yielded by the 
recursive definition we must read the latter as similarly elliptical. 
It is clear that Attractive Idea avoids the contradiction because of the act variable. Even 
if it is not correct to place more weight on Q than on ∅ in deliberation about whether to 
do b Attractive Idea does not combine with that to entail that Q is not weightier than ∅ 
because it says nothing about what holds for sets of reasons to do a when deliberating 
about whether to do b.  
In fact, however, what we have just is seen is the first emergence of a problem about 
the upshot of the act variables in Schroeder’s principles: whether and how the weightier 
than relation is  relativised to acts and whether and how the principles that Schroeder 
enunciates as relative to acts can be taken in that way without getting into difficulty. The 
problem is that there are places where Schroeder needs the relativization and others where 
he needs its absence (which I think is why the variables are there in Attractive Idea but get 
dropped by the time we get to the recursive definition and Still Attractive) and he can’t 
have it both ways.  
The relativization here can be done in two ways. I think that Schroeder does not in fact 
want the weightier-than relation itself relativised to acts. If he does then the formal model 
we have looked at is defectively specified since there would have to be a weightier-than 
relation for each act. That is to say, it is not that D can be weightier than E but that D is 
weightier-with-respect-to-doing-a than E.  
The other way that preserves the single weightier than relation is for the defined 
principle Attractive Idea to set a restriction on the pairs that stand in the weightier-than 
relation: 
Same Action For D and E in SS, D≻E only if there is a Pa ∈{Pa: a∈A}such 
that both D and  E are in Pa. 
Under this restriction, Attractive Idea does say something unified about all the pairs in ≻ 
because, since ∅ is in each Pa, Attractive Idea applies to the base pairs also. Note that in 
solving these problems by this restriction we have abandoned the generality of the weight 
of reasons. 
                                                 
18 That is to say, the difference between them is supposed to be only the difference between ‘an 
extensional thesis rather than an analysis’.  
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Does the recursive definition entail Attractive Idea? 
It is evident that Same Action is not entailed by the recursive definition but is an 
additional constraint on ≻ that Schroeder did not express explicitly. It is also evident that  
strict attention to the act variable in Attractive Idea and supposing ≻ to satisfy Attractive 
Idea means that Attractive Idea places Same Action as a constraint on ≻. Furthermore, the 
content of Attractive Idea is at least equal to and may exceed Same Action. Since 
Attractive Idea contains the content of Same Action, which is not entailed by the recursive 
definition, the latter cannot entail Attractive Idea. So Schroeder’s claim that the recursive 
definition  yields Attractive Idea is under threat and cannot be understood as entailment. 
Can he preserve compatibility? 
Is Attractive Idea consistent with the recursive definition? 
The Relativity of Placing Weight causes problems for compatibility. Let us now 
suppose the action in the triples of D is a and the action in the triples of E is b where a ≠ b 
and each act is irrelevant to the other. In deliberating whether to a it is correct to place 
more weight on D than on E  but in deliberating whether to b it is correct to place more 
weight on E than on D. So by Attractive Idea D are weightier reasons to do a than E and E 
are weightier reasons to do b than D. If the recursive definition of ≻ satisfies Attractive 
Idea then D≻E and E≻D but that contradicts the partial order axioms. So either ≻ is not a 
partial order or it is inconsistent with Attractive Idea.  
Does Attractive Idea entail Ought and Correct? 
So we have seen that to get round one problem we had to attend strictly to the act variable 
in Attractive Idea and we have also see that attending strictly to it produces another 
problem. We will now see a problem for the entailment of the principles Ought and 
Correct that originates in the same way. We will also see a general problem for ≻ 
satisfying Correct.  
We start with the principle Ought that is to be explained by Attractive Idea.  
Let SX,A be the set of all of the reasons for X to do A and SX,~A be the set of all 
of the reasons for X not to do A. Then…  
Ought For it to be the case that X ought to do A is for it to be the case that S 
X,A ≻S X,~A. (Schroeder 2007a:130) 
The problem here is, in essence, that because Attractive Idea implies only sets of reasons 
for a single action can weigh more than each other, S X,A cannot be weightier than  S X,~A 
because A is not the same action as ~A.19  
More formally, SX,A  and  SX,~A are in SS. By Same Action, S X,A ≻S X,~A only if there is a 
Pa ∈{Pa: a∈A}such that both S X,A  and  S X,~A  are in Pa. Because A is not the same action 
as ~A there are distinct members of {Pa: a∈A} with S X,A  in one and  S X,~A  in the other, 
but since {Pa\∅: a∈A} partitions SS\∅  the intersection of those distinct members contains 
only ∅ so unless one or both are ∅ there is no member of {Pa: a∈A} containing both. 
Since in the general case neither S X,A  nor  S X,~A is ∅, S X,A ⊁S X,~A. 
 
 
Let us now turn to the principle Correct that is to be explained by Attractive Idea. 
                                                 
19 Schroeder’s S X,A is our Tx,a  but because the indices reduce the potential for confusion (unlike 
his earlier ambiguous use of ‘S’) I have kept his notation here. 
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Let S A be the set of all reasons of the right kind to do A and S ~A be the set of 
all reasons of the right kind not to do A. Then …  
Correct For it to be correct to do A is for it to be the case that SA ≻S ~A . 
(Schroeder 2007a:134) 
The first problem here is that this principle doesn’t work because SA ≻S ~A  is 
necessarily false under the recursive definition of ≻. The problem originates in 
Schroeder’s definition of:  
Right Kind of Reasons The right kind of reasons to do A are reasons that 
are shared by everyone engaged in the activity of doing A, such that the fact 
that they are engaged in doing A is sufficient to explain why these are 
reasons for them. (Schroeder 2007a:135) 
Schroeder takes it that all reasons are what he calls agent relational reasons, reasons for 
someone (see Schroeder 2007a:16 fn.25), which is why the members of S are triples that 
include a person. We can understand what Schroeder means by a shared reason by 
considering his definition of  
Agent-Neutral [Reason] For R to be a reason to do A is for R to be an 
agent-relational reason for all of us to do A.  
As I understand Agent-Neutral, context can determine who counts as one of 
‘us’(Schroeder 2007a:18) 
So what this means is that for r to be an agent neutral reason to do a is just for <r, x, a> 
(an agent relational reason) to be in each person x’s set of reasons to do it: 
r is an agent-neutral reason to do a just in case for all x in X, {<r, x, a>}∈ Px 
This gives us the set of agent neutral reasons as  
ANR ={<r, n, a>: <r, n, a>∈S and ∀x∈X <r, x, a>∈ Px } 
Right Kind of Reasons appears to take the context of being engaged in the activity as 
determining who counts as one of us. So to get SA we take that subset of X, call it U,  
which contains the people engaged in the activity of doing A, when  
SA ={<r, n, a>: <r, n, a>∈S and ∀x∈ U <r, x, a>∈ Px } 
Assuming that more than one person is engaged in the activity, what this means is that for 
distinct persons y and z who are in U, if r is a right kind of reason to do A, both <r, y, A> 
and <r, z, A> are in the set of the right kind of reason to do A, SA. The same goes for S ~A. 
That means that neither SA nor S ~A can be in SS since all members of SS are sets of added 
reasons and a set of added reasons must have the same person in the second place in each 
triple. Hence SA ≻S ~A is necessarily false because the relata of ≻ have to be in SS. 
Whence Correct entails that it is impossible for it to be correct to do A.  
This is potentially a serious problem for Schroeder. Just so far as the considerations by 
which he motivates Correct and Right Kind of Reasons are strong, just that far do they 
undermine the success of his definition of the weight of reasons. Schroeder doesn’t only 
defend Correct and Right Kind of Reasons in his book. In a later paper he defends the 
same two principles (see RKR and Correct, Schroeder 2010:38-39) 
There is a way round this, namely to reformulate Correct in terms of the set of all the 
right kind of reasons for a specific person (i.e. for some x, SA ∩ Px ), since if they are 
shared then the weighing for one person should do as well as for any other. The problem 
now is whether such a reformulated Correct has the same support of our intuitions. The 
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appeal of Correct is precisely in part that it is in terms of the set of all the right kinds of 
reasons, not just some of them, and although one can see how the reformulation gets out 
of this difficulty it does look a bit ad hoc, since it is motivated purely by the difficulty the 
theory has got into rather than any prior appeal to relativising Correct to one particular 
agent.  
Granted this solution to the problem, Correct now falls into the same problem that faced 
Ought. Once again, because Attractive Idea implies only sets of reasons for a single action 
can weigh more than each other, S A  cannot be weightier than  S ~A because A is not the 
same action as ~A. The formal proof is the same as for Ought.  
So, having seen earlier where Schroeder needs Attractive Idea rather than Still 
Attractive, here is where Schroeder needs Still Attractive rather than Attractive Idea. 
Reading Still Attractive strictly rather than as an ellipsis we have something sufficient for 
explaining Ought and Correct since it speaks of any old sets of reasons in SS. 
Fred’s reasons can be weightier than mine 
We now turn to a further problem over whether the theory allows for the generality of 
the weight of reasons. Fred’s reasons to do something can be weightier than mine so this 
is something the theory shouldn’t exclude. It is excluded by  an implication of his 
rejection of weights as quantities.  
Though it makes sense to ask how Ronnie's two reasons to go to the party 
add up, I do not think that it makes sense to ask how Ronnie's reason to go 
to the party adds up with Susan's reason to go to the lounge. Ronnie's two 
reasons to go to the party need to be able to add up in order to outweigh his 
reason to stay away. But it is simply bizarre to think that Ronnie's reason to 
go to the party and Susan's reason to go to the lounge can add up in some 
way, for there is nothing that they would need to outweigh….Since I don't 
think this makes sense, I think it should be a constraint on an adequate 
account of the weight of reasons that it rule this out. (Schroeder 2007a:126) 
What he is saying here is that speaking of adding reasons is really just a way of speaking 
of what really matters: whether some ‘added’ reasons outweigh other ‘added’ reasons or 
not. Turning to the formal account, it is just a way of speaking of whether sets of added 
reasons stand in the weightier-than relation. So it is standing in the weightier-than relation 
that is primary and whether specific reasons can be added is entailed by them belonging to 
distinct sets of reasons that do stand in that relation. This means that if we are to rule out 
the reasons of different persons being added up then sets of reasons of different persons 
cannot stand in the weightier-than relation. But that means that Fred’s reasons to do 
something cannot be weightier than mine nor vice versa. 
Now that argument is disputable depending on exactly what is required for the 
constraint to be captured formally. On this interpretation I have taken the weightier-than 
relation being primary amounting to it being necessary and sufficient for addition but the 
argument can be avoided if primality can be captured by necessity alone. 
There is, however, another way in which Schroeder’s theory may rule out Fred’s 
reasons being weightier than mine. Making ≻ depend on correctness in deliberation may 
rule this out. If I am deliberating about whether to do something I can’t make any direct 
use of the thought that Fred has a heavier reason to do it than I do. For I am deliberating 
about whether I will do it and his reason to do it as such is not a reason in the way that 
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mine is for me.20 The way his having a heavier reason can be a reason bearing on me 
doing it requires not his reason, r, but the fact of his reason, <r, Fred, a>, being a reason 
for me for some reason or other, such as that I can persuade him or predict his action 
knowing his reason. So his triple in the set of his reasons is <r, Fred, a> but that is not the 
kind of thing that I can weigh, whereas the kind of thing I can weigh is  my triple <<r, 
Fred, a>, me, a>, but that can’t be in his set of reasons. Therefore Fred’s reason is not 
something whose weight I weigh against mine in deliberation on whether I do something,  
but rather, that he has that reason is a reason for me. So I can’t weigh Fred’s reason as 
such at all, so a fortiori I can’t weigh it more heavily than mine in deliberating what to 
do. Consequently (and assuming that being correct requires being possible) in Schroeder’s 
theory Fred’s reasons cannot weigh more than mine. 
It may appear that we can get out of this problem by drawing attention to the apparent 
agent neutrality of the reasons in Attractive Idea, since then I deliberate not on my reasons 
but just on reasons to do something, among which might be reasons that I do it and 
reasons that Fred does it. This would work if Schroeder had agent neutral reasons as a 
non-Humean might have them. There, all reasons are agent neutral and an agent relational 
reason for me to do something is just an agent neutral reason that I do it.21 But for 
Schroeder it is exactly the other way round. All reasons are agent relational and speaking 
of an agent neutral reason to do something is speaking of a complicated fact about a 
relation among agent relational reasons, for example, that <r, me, a> is an agent neutral 
reason I have just in case <r, me, a> is in Pme and ∀x∈X <r, x, a>∈ Px. 22 
So we haven’t got much further since for reasons already given Fred’s agent neutral 
reason, <r, Fred, a>, still cannot figure in my deliberations in the right way for me to 
place weight on it. It is true that we each have a ‘copy’ of each others agent neutral 
reasons so some work can be got done. Unfortunately it still doesn’t get us what we were 
looking for. Without a variable for the agent to relativise the correct placement of weight 
in Attractive Idea the ordering of my agent neutral reasons and his must be same so we 
still can’t get his reasons being weightier than mine.  
At this point, having been reminded of the nature of Schroeder’s agent neutral reasons, 
it is tempting to think that we can at least manage a simulacrum of Fred’s reasons being 
weightier than mine. There is a representation of his agent neutral reasons in my reasons 
because of the ‘copies’ of each other’s agent neutral reasons  that we have and in that way 
his reasons could get weighed against mine. That is true, so far as it goes, which is not far 
enough because what makes Fred’s reasons weightier than mine need not be agent neutral 
reasons but reasons he has that I don’t.  
Finally, if the apparent agent neutrality of Attractive Idea is taken strictly we would 
have a failing of the theory on exactly one of the motivating issues for Schroeder. It would 
mean that only agent neutral reasons are defined to have weights.  
                                                 
20 It might be that because <r, Fred, a> and <r, me, a> are in S, r is a reason for both of us but that 
is beside the point, not least because that is not the general case and we are trying to allow for 
Fred’s reasons to be heavier than mine. In Schroeder’s theory that requires the set including <r, 
Fred, a> to have more weight placed on it that the set including <r, me, a>.  
21 I’m being a bit short here, but an example might be a general agent neutral reason for parents to 
look after their children and then because I am the parent of this child there is an agent neutral that 
I feed him but no agent neutral reasons of this kind that anyone else do. 
22 Alternatively, you might take an agent neutral reason to do a  to be the set {<r, n, a>: <r, n, 
a>∈S and ∀x∈X <r, x, a>∈ Px } but that is not going to help at all since it is not in SS and so can’t 
be a relatum of ≻. 
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Correctness of me or Fred placing weight 
If we suppose, contra the arguments just given, that the account does allow the full 
generality of the weight of reasons and that I can weigh Fred’s reasons against mine in 
deliberation, then one final problem emerges. We saw a problem for Still Attractive 
because of its absence of an act variable. Essentially the same problem now arises for 
Attractive Idea because of its absence of a person variable. Suppose that D and E are sets 
of reasons to a and that D is in  Pme and E is in PFred and that neither of our reasons bear 
on each others doing or not doing a. Then, assuming that I can weigh Fred’s reasons 
against mine in deliberation, it is correct for me to place more weight on D than on E so 
by Attractive Idea D≻ E and it is not correct for Fred to place more weight on D than on 
E so D⊁E. Also it is correct for Fred to place more weight on E than on D so E ≻ D. So 
we have a contradiction and also inconsistency with the partial order axioms. We can 
block these if we have a person variable in Attractive Idea, which would amount to 
placing this constraint on ≻: 
Same Person For D and E in SS, D≻E only if there is a Px ∈{Px:  x∈X}such 
that both D and  E are in Px. 
The price of this constraint is to return, once again, to the theory excluding Fred’s reasons 
to do something being weightier than mine and to the theory thereby failing to allow the 
generality of the weight of reasons.  
Fixing consonance 
The dissonances we have seen subsequent to the first two isolated ones are, I think, 
fairly characterised as dissonances in the heart of the rigourous account. They have their 
root in what I called the Relativity of Placing Weight. I concede that in developing these 
dissonances I have made blunt and brute appeals to intuitions about the context relativity 
of the correctness of placing weight. As always, such appeals to intuition are up for 
dispute. Nevertheless, I think they have prima facie plausibility, as do Schroeder’s 
principles. What I think the dissonances bring to light, in part because of the definiteness 
of Schroeder’s principles, is some hitherto unclear conflicts between our intuitions about 
these relativities of correct weighing to acts and persons and intuitions about the 
generality of the weight of reasons.  
Attractive Idea formulates weightier-than and the correctness of placing weight in 
deliberation relative to an act and is about reasons to do the act. Ought is formulated 
relative to a person and act and is about all the reasons had by the person for and against 
that act. Correct is formulated relative to an act and the right kind of reasons for and 
against the act, reasons shared by everyone engaged in the activity of doing that act.23 The 
recursive definition is given without any such relativities just because where Schroeder 
wants to end up is with the generality of the weight of reasons.  
                                                 
23 In fact there is a problem with Right Kind of Reasons which manifests in the oddness of saying 
‘the activity of doing that act’, something that gets said because the relativity of Right Kind of 
Reasons is restricted to a single act variable. It can be shown that this doesn’t work but the 
problem can be fixed by formulating it with both an act and an activity variable: The Right Kind 
of Reasons  to do a certain act are reasons to do it shared by everyone engaged in a certain 
activity, such that the fact that they are engaged in that certain activity is sufficient to explain why 
these are reasons for them. Then this gives us Correct Deliberation: the correctness of placing 
more weight on D than on E is for the reasons to place more weight on D than on E that are shared 
by everyone deliberating to be heavier than the reasons not to do so that are shared by everyone so 
engaged, and for the fact they are deliberating to be sufficient to explain why those are reasons for 
them. 
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It is no accident that these have been formulated with their various specific relativities. 
It is in part in virtue of those relativities that they sound right, that they get intuitive 
support. If instead we start removing or adding in relativities to fix the dissonances we 
may find our intuitions running the other way.  
There is a reason why Schroeder started with Attractive Idea. With the act variable in 
place and read as elliptical with respect to the who of the reasons being kept fixed (and 
setting aside the circularity worries over what correct deliberation is), it is exactly where it 
is intuitively plausible that he can start. Recall his reduction of reasons to being parts of 
explanations of why a person in doing something is promoting something they desire. 
Given this reduction it is initially comprehensible that for a specific person in deliberating 
on whether to do something it would be correct for him to place more weight on some 
reasons than on others to do it. It may bear further explanation, but possibilities for such 
explanation seem near to hand: for example, one reason shows the promotion to be more 
likely or more direct. So even though Schroeder’s official story via the correctness of 
placing weight has an incipient circularity the possibility of these kinds of explanations 
show us the kind of thing that might ground it (thereby thinking that something else is to 
hand to replace the obscurities of the regress in the recursive definition). On the one hand 
they give plausibility to weighing for Schroeder’s reasons without having to appeal to the 
strength of desires. On the other hand they show what kind of thing the right kind of 
reasons for placing more weight on one set than another might be. So we have something 
with which to mollify the circularity worry. 
If, by contrast, he started with something in terms of it being correct for that specific 
person to place more weight on some reasons to do it than some other reasons not to do it, 
in the general case we are comparing explanations of why doing something is promoting 
something they desire with explanations of why not doing it is promoting some other 
thing they desire. Given Schroeder’s rejection of proportionalism (so we can’t explain 
correctness of placing more weight on one that the other by strength of desire) it is 
difficult to see a basis for the comparison just because the underlying desires that explain 
the reasons are distinct. Now all we have to look to is Correct and we have nothing to set 
against its incipient circularity and the obscurity we have seen in the recursive definition. 
We might instead appeal to the brute plausibility (in a specific case) of being heavier 
making it being correct to place more weight on some reasons to do it than some other 
reasons not to do it. My worry then would be either that the explanation is going the 
wrong way or that behind it is the wrong intuition for Schroeder’s purposes. Going the 
wrong way, in that the correctness of placing weight is being explained by an intuition 
about the reasons for doing it being heavier than the reasons not to do it. The wrong 
intuition, in that it is if you ought to do it then it is correct to place more weight on the 
reasons for it than against it.  And this is no good for Schroeder because he wants to 
analyse ‘ought’ in terms of the weight of reasons, not the weight of reasons in terms of 
‘ought’. So that is why he didn’t start here. 
The nexus is the contrast between Attractive Idea, with relativities in place, and Still 
Attractive, without them, as what is yielded by the recursive definition. The relativity of 
correctly placing weight in deliberation sounds right in Attractive Idea but that blocks 
explanation of Ought and Correct. Omitting the relativity of correctly placing weight, as 
in Still Attractive, gets us the explanation of Ought and Correct but fails to solve the 
disjunctive problem and falls into contradiction. 
What is going on here is that Attractive Idea and Still Attractive are trying to face both 
ways, to meet incompatible demands: on the reasons side to get the general weighing of 
sets of reasons, on the correct placing of weight side to get the relativity to act and person. 
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Attractive Idea sounds right when we focus on the correctness of placing weight, but 
when we turn our attention to weighing reasons in general the restriction to reasons for a 
specific act looks dispensable. Hence we accept Still Attractive on the intuition that 
supported Attractive Idea. But then if we examine Still Attractive while focusing again on 
the correctness of placing weight, even if sets of reasons can generally outweigh one 
another, it is not clear that that alone makes it correct to place more weight on one set of 
reasons rather than another without reference to the context of deliberation, what act is 
being deliberated on and who is doing the deliberation. The truism to which Schroeder 
appealed earlier, that  ‘if one reason is weightier than another , it is correct to place more 
weight on it in deliberation.’ (Schroeder 2007a:122), has some implicit contextual 
restriction on the domain of reasons that get into the antecedent. 
So in the Humean framework that Schroeder is promoting, there is a gap between 
where Schroeder starts, sets of agent relational reasons for a specific person to do a 
specific thing,24 and where he wants to get to, weighing sets of reasons in general.25 What 
I think the dissonances have brought to light is that there is an interesting difficulty lying 
in the way that Schroeder has taken to get across the gap, a difficulty located not so much 
in the regress but in the relation between reasons outweighing one another and the 
correctness of placing weight in deliberation. The former is intuitively general whereas 
the latter is intuitively relative to acts and persons. The former is where he needs to get to, 
the latter, with their relativities matching his agent relational reasons, is where it seems 
unproblematic for him to start.  In moving from Attractive Idea to Still Attractive whilst 
claiming identity (modulo the difference between ‘an extensional thesis rather than an 
analysis’) Schroeder hasn’t overcome the difficulty but sidestepped it. Fixing it would 
require a deeper understanding of this relation and additional defined principles. In 
particular it would require a more complex account of the right kind of reasons for 
deliberation. Schroeder has two papers on the right kind of reasons (Schroeder 2010, 
2012d) but I do not see in them material that bears here. 
Conclusion 
Someone sympathetic to Humean theories of reasons, such as myself, might wonder 
whether the kind of approach Schroeder is taking can get round the problems we have 
seen. The suggestion that weighing is regressive, based in the analogy with defeaters, is 
interesting. We have seen that Schroeder’s implementation of this idea by his recursive 
definition contains significant obscurities that undermine the support given by the analogy 
leaving it unclear whether it achieves what it sets out to achieve. Whilst Schroeder’s 
implementation may yet be fixed, it would be at the cost of significant technical 
complication. Complication alone need not be a heavy fault since I see no reason to 
expect a neat theory: in general morality is messy and depends intricately on a lot of the 
particular detail of cases. We should therefore expect the true theory of reasons to be 
messy in some respects. Unfortunately, technical complication perhaps entails a heavy 
theoretical burden, since each technical complication requires its own substantive 
philosophical motivation in Humean terms, or at least, motivation in terms consistent with 
Humeanism.26 Providing such motivations is a significant philosophical challenge in its 
                                                 
24 i.e. sets in Px,a for specific x and a. 
25i.e. sets in SS\∅, which is partitioned by each of {Px,a\∅:  x∈X ,a∈A}, {Px\∅:  x∈X} and {Pa\∅: 
a∈A} and which partitionings are the formal ground of the problems. 
26 Schroeder questions whether ‘every adjustment would need to be motivated on Humean terms’ 
although agrees that one might be motivated to think this ‘by a reading of the somewhat 
aggressive dialectical posture of the book’ Schroeder 2012c.  
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own right. Against this we might put my earlier remarks about the virtues of rigourous 
accounts and the support got for such an account by its getting things right despite internal 
technical complexity. Given the naturalism that Schroeder is aiming at he might be very 
happy at taking the move often taken by scientists: of recommending replacing our loose 
common concepts with those of a rigourous theory that is getting a lot right.  
Nevertheless, at the moment the account itself is obscure, the nature of the technical 
fixes that might be needed is unknown and the philosophical motivation of any such fixes 
is a further and perhaps significant difficulty. The central dissonances discussed are at the 
heart of the account and appear to be grounded in the relativity of the correct placement of 
weight, which relativity obstructs the path from the recursive definition to the broader 
explanatory objectives of the account. I therefore think we are still waiting for a plausible 
Humean theory of reasons.  
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